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Abstract: 
Since the collapse of the USSR, Syria has remained to be center of Russian Middle East 
foreign policy regarding its economic and political ties. As a result of the Arab Spring, the Syrian 
regime and President Assad has shaken with the unrestrained uprisings and western sanctions and 
eventually crisis turned into a fierce civil war. From the inauguration of the crisis Russia has never 
altered its political view on Syria even though there were expectations to the contrary. Moscow 
officially remained calling for “No military intervention against Syria” and that’s why three times 
vetoed US resolutions concerning widening sanctions or allowing multilateral military operations. 
However, Russia claims that Moscow is not protective of Syrian regime or Assad instead prevents 
Syria to fall into a long-term civil war. On the other hand, Syria is one of the most crucial arms 
importer of Russia and hosting Russian naval base on its Mediterranean coast. In this paper it is aimed 
to analyze the Russian stable and consistent foreign policy on Syria and its reasons as well as latest 
Russian and US rising tensions.  
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Introduction 
Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia paid attention not only on the former Soviet Union 
Republics and its diaspora, the Middle East has remained of substantial interest in Moscow. Russia has 
the largest Muslim population in Europe and wants to have good relations with the Islamic world.127 
Meanwhile for a long time Syria has remained one of the most independent countries from the West, 
particularly the US and has had close relations with Russia which was established during the Soviet 
Union. During the Cold War as a result of close relationship many Russians moved to Syria –
intermarriages- and in return, many Syrian elites studied at top Russian schools such as Moscow State 
University and People’s Friendship University.”128 Following the dissolution of the USSR, Chechen 
issue has emerged twice as a fundamentalist and a separatist movement in the southern border of 
Russia.129 Thus, unremitting close relations with Islam world is crucial for Russia due to prevent the 
financial and political support for these fundamentalist Islamic movements in Russia as a whole.130  
Ever since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Russia and the rest of the Western world has 
encountered many times in the international arena. Despite the fact that Russia has never changed its 
position from the beginning, the statements of Russian officials were occasionally acknowledged as 
compromising step, Moscow committed itself calling for single strategy: “No military intervention 
against Syria”. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has pointed out that Russia had many questions after 
the UN Security Council adopted the Libyan resolution which allowed military intervention to protect 
civilian lives and turned into Libya chaotic. Consequently Lavrov has described Russia’s position in 
the Syrian case as; “We are not protecting any regime” and opposed a Libya-style military 
                                                          
127 Kreutz, Andrej, “Syria: Russia’s Best Asset in the Middle East”, IFRI/NIS Center, Russie.Nei.Visions., No.55, 
November, p.5. 
128 Barshchevskaya, Anna, “Russia’s Many Interest in Syria”, Policy Watch 2023, 24 January 2013, p.1. 
129 Kreutz, ibid, p.5. 
130 Sharp, Jeremy, and Blanchard, Christopher M., “Armed Conflict in Syria: US and International Regime”, CRS RL33487, 
21 August 2012, p.7; “In early 2012, US officials stated that the violence and disorder paralyzing Syria was creating 
opportunities for Al Qaeda operaives and other violent Islamist extremists to inflitrate the country and conduct or plan 
attack.” 
 446 
 
intervention against the Syrian regime.131 Syria was the most consistently pro-Soviet state in the 
Middle East until the mid 1990s and in the meantime it seems that still contains specialty for the 
Russian Federation.  
Main Pillars of Russian Foreign Policy Towards Syria 
Afterwards Yeltsin inherited cold relations between Damascus and Moscow from the 
Gorbachev era and revived the close relationship that existed under Brezhnev. Russia always has 
separated its bilateral relations in the Middle East are regarding Israel and others. For instance 
Gorbachev refused to support Syria’s objective of achieving strategic party with Israel did not mean 
that Moscow was prepared to abandon its interests in the Middle East altogether. For this reason, the 
USSR continued to supply air defense systems to Syria.132 Moreover in 1994 when Russian Federation 
was troubled with the transformation of its economy, Kremlin postponed Syria’s 10 billion $ debt and 
proposed import by some Syrian goods instead of paying.133 Starting from 1998 Russia began to play 
more active role in the Middle East peace process. Primakov, then Russian Foreign Minister, remained 
pragmatic concerning the Israel and its neighbors.134  
By coincidence, long time Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad died in the middle of 2000, during the 
first year of Putin’s presidency and Vladimir Putin telephoned the new Syrian leader Bashar-al-Ashad, 
son of Hafez al-Assad and commemorated his father as “one of the most outstanding and distinguished 
leaders in the modern world”, and “a friend of Russia who did so much for the development of 
Russian-Syrian cooperation.135 At this point Kreutz describes Putin’s Syria foreign policy as 
“preserving and if possible expanding Russian-Syrian relations in order to maintain positive aspects of 
previous Moscow-Middle Eastern involvement, and to promote Russia’s image as a country friendly 
toward Islamic peoples”.136 In terms of economic ties, Syria is one of the significant market for 
Russia’s arms sales and also shortly before the Syrian crisis, Gazprom prepared for the leading role in 
Syria’s oil and gas industry.137 Hence if Assad regime falls, Russia might lose its contracts as its was 
happened in Iraq and Libya before. Furthermore, former Russian President Medvedev made a 
noteworthy visit to Syria in May 2010 and also met with Hamas leader Khalid Mashaal. During the 
visit of President Medvedev, he stated that Hamas should be included in the Middle East process 
despite Israel’s opposition to the Islamist movement and displayed Russian involvement in the Middle 
East crisis.138 
Subsequently in the midst of the Arab Spring, starting from 2010, the uprising began to 
organize in some towns of Syria against the Assad regime. When protests reached Syria in March 
2011, in the southern town of Deroa, the protesters called on Assad to reform not resign.139 
Nevertheless two years passed and unlike the Libyan, Egyptian or Tunisian case, the Syrian regime is 
still able to pay its military and civilian staff and it has also enough currency reserves140 as well as an 
affiliation of Russian and Iranian aids. At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the US and EU have 
bolstered unilateral sanctions and tried to pass resolutions to deepen international pressures and have 
openly called for President Assad to step aside.141 Moreover a multilateral intervention either led by 
NATO or by an Anglo-French-American-Turkish coalition appeared as an only solution142 whereby 
Russia highly opposed to this option.  
                                                          
131 Middle East Online, “Russia Will Not Allow Libya-Style Military Intervention in Syria”, 1 November 2011, 
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=48833 
132 Nizameddin, Tala, “Russia and the Middle East”, C.Hurst & Co.Pub., 1999, p.160.  
133 Ibid, p.161. 
134 Ginat, Rami, “Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Naitonalism: From Independence to Dependence”, Sussex Academic Press, 
2010, p.232. 
135 Kreutz, Andrej, “Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?”, Greenwood Pub. Group, 2007, p.25. 
136 Ibid, p.25. 
137 Barshchevskaya, ibid, p.2; “According to the Stockholm International Peace Resrearch Institute, Russia accounted for 
78% of Syria’s wepoans puschases between 2007-2012…Beyond weaponry, Russian companies have invested $20 billion in 
Syria since 2009 according to the Moscow Times.”  
138 Rawshandil, Jalil and Lean, Nathan Chapman, “Iran, Israel, and the US: Regime Security Vs. Political Legitimacy”, 
ABC-CLIO, 2011, p.76. 
139 Phillips, Christopher, “Syria’s Bloody Arab Spring”, LSE IDEAS Special Report, May 2012, p.37. 
140 Chatham House, “The Political Outlook For Syria”, MENA Programme: Meeting Sumamry, January 2012, p.4. 
141 Nerguizian, Aram, “Instability in Syria: Assessing the Risk of Military Intervention”, CSIS, 13 December 2011, p.ii. 
142 Weiss, Micheal, “Safe Area For Syria: An Assessment of Legality, Logistics and Hazards”, Strategic Research & 
Communication Centre, Transitonal Period Policy Research, 2011, p.7.  
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Syria is Russia’s last remaining robust Arab ally in the Middle East and Syria is hosting a 
Russian naval base that is located Syrian Mediterranean coast Tartus constructed in 1971. Russia’s 
naval presence in Tartus might have three aims: Russian support for Assad; score of NATO or 
Western powers with encirclement of a regional ally; and a message of any campaign would return 
Western-Russian relations to Cold War lows.143 Despite the central role that Syria played in Russia’s 
foreign policy, Kremlin mostly concentrated on diplomacy instead of the use of force. Hence Russia 
provides Assad a diplomatic umbrella in the UN, protecting it from resolutions and preventing a 
possible international intervention.144 Additionally in order to prevent fall of the Assad regime, Russia, 
together with China, vetoed three times –October 2011, February 2012 and July 2012- UN Security 
Council resolutions targeting multinational military intervention against Syria.145 Although Russia has 
refused to back any UN Security Council resolution threatening sanctions or military force against the 
Assad regime, Moscow has supported a UN-led process to establish a political and diplomatic solution 
in Syria and received visiting representatives of Syrian opposition delegates over the two years.146 In 
addition to that Russia worries that a post-Assad Syria will be dominated by Islamists, who would 
encourage Islamist movements in southern regions of Russia.147 Currently on the one hand, Iran148 and 
Russia actively support the Assad regime and provide aid; on the other hand, the US, Europe, regional 
countries such as Turkey and Qatar provides aid to opposition groups in Syria.149 
In the middle of the 2012 the hopes of falling of Assad began to drop off because it was 
connoted that the regime will survive in the long-term and will fight for it. Despite opposition in Syria 
receives financial and arms aid, the Assad regime has the advantage of military capability and may be 
able to fight for a couple of years more unless there is a massive uprising in Damascus and Aleppo, or 
an intervention. Notwithstanding Russian support for the Syrian existing regime has been an obstacle 
to international action.150 For this reason some claims that Russia should be persuaded that continuing 
support of the Assad regime is dangerous for Russia due to reason of collapse of the regime and create 
a political vacuum in Syria that would not serve Russia’s foreign policy interests at all.151 In other 
words, Russia’s objections to regime change in third countries such as Syria are rooted not only in 
principles of state sovereignty and noninterference but also about what happens after the fall of the 
regime.152 
Is Russia Giving Up on Syria? 
For Moscow, Syria events portrayals different meanings than Tunisia, Libya or Egypt due to 
reason of Damascus close relationship with Moscow in last six decades. Both countries have depth 
historical relations and mutual benefits which are important in terms of continuity and durability. 
Therefore Syria has been considered as an ally of Moscow in the Middle East since the days of the 
Cold War and in return until the collapse of the USSR, Damascus  had  kept its loyalty to Moscow. 
After the recovery of administration in Moscow with by Putin’s authoritarian presidency, Russia’s 
primary connection option was again Syria among the other Middle Eastern countries. The place of the 
Middle East in the foreign policy of the Kremlin had remained similarly even during the President 
Medvedev and then the same approach continues with the coming of President Putin for the third time. 
When we look at the importance of Syria in Moscow detailed:  
                                                          
143 Ibid. 
144 Geifman, Anna and Teper, Yuri, “Russia’s Declining Influence in the Middle East”, BESA Center Perspectives, Paper 
No.194, 24 December 2012, p.2. 
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Working Papers 12, 16 October 2012, p.7. 
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Institute, MEMO No.21, March 2012, p.3. 
148 Clawson, Patrick, “Post-Assad Syria: Opportunity or Quagmine?”, Naitonal Defense university, Strategic Forum, SF 
No.276, Febuary 2012, p.6. 
149 Byman, Doran, Pollak, and Shaikh, ibid, p.5. 
150 Chatham House, “The Political Outlook For Syria”, MENA Programme: Meeting Sumamry, January 2012, p.2. 
151 Bellin, Eva and Krause, Peter, “Intervetnion in Syria: Reconciling Moral Premises and Realistic Outcomes”, Brandeis 
University, Middle East Brief No.64, June 2012, p.5. 
152 Trenin, Dmitri, “The Mythical Alliance: Russia’s Syria Policy”, The Carnegie Papers, February 2013, p.6. 
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• Russia’s Syria policy is linked with  that Syria that is positioned in the strategic heart of the 
Middle East, and that Moscow’s links to the Assad family go back to four decades.153 
• Russia has a commercial supremacy in the region in terms of arms trade and in consequence 
Moscow does not want to lose this supremacy. Syria is among the largest purchasers of Russian 
weapons and currently two countries have ongoing contracts that amount of $3.5 billion.154 
Alternatively foreign arms supplies to the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad had 
increased dramatically over the period 2007-2011, compared to the five previous years.  In March 
2012  the SIPRI report indicated that Syria's imports of major weapons were increased by 580% 
between 2002 to 2006 and 2007 to 2011 which 78% of arms were Russian supply.155 
• In the post- Cold War era Russia commenced to follow a new concept of foreign policy which is 
called “multipolar world order” policy in order to regain a global power status and balance US 
unipolar actions mostly by diplomatic efforts. Russia was opposed both the Iraqi war and also 
military intervention in Libya and made efforts to prevent US military operations in the region by 
perpetrating diplomatic tools in international organizations. In this sense preventing a foreign 
military intervention in Syria by diplomatic efforts serves for Russian multipolar foreign policy 
approach. 
• Another reason is a population of Circassians that are living in Syria who still hold direct ties to 
their relatives in the Northern Caucasus. Syria is home to approximately 150,000 Circassians 
about half of whom live in Huron province who retain their linguistic characters from Adyghe in 
the Northern Caucasus. The Circassians are considered as a warrior class and participated in many 
Syrian military campaigns and police actions over the decades. They are secular and supporters of 
the Assad regime and generally before the outbreak of violence in Syria, fared well with the other 
faiths found in the country.156 Consequently the security of Circassians in the region has crucial 
importance for Russia. In this respect, the main problem for the Circassians in Syria is post-Assad 
era. 
• After  the “color revolutions” in  the former Soviet region, Russia was alarmed that Moscow was 
losing its influence area and/or revolutions were spreading in Russia. From the Moscow point of 
view Arab Spring events were similar to “color revolutions” in 2005-2006 and incited by foreign 
forces instead of local society. Therefore Russia took the position in support of the status quo in 
order to prevent civil wars.”157 
• Finally Russia focused on its fight against Islamists in its southern underbelly in Chechnya and 
Daghestan, also worries that a post-Asad Syria will be dominated by Islamists, who would be 
hostile to Moscow.158 Hence according to the UN Refugee Agency that “Chechens Are Among 
Foreigners Fighting to Overthrow Bashar al-Assad”. In addition according to an AFP source in 
Riyadh, there are at least 6,000 foreign militants fighting in Syria, under the flag of al-Qaeda. The 
most important point is most of the fighters comes from some Arab countries but there are also 
some from Chechyna.159 
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After Houla events on May 25th, 2012 in which 108 persons were killed, the US hoped that it 
would be a “turning point” in Russia’s reluctance to act against ambiguity of Syria. Despite the fact 
that Kremlin supported a UN Security Council resolution condemning Syria for using artillery in the 
massacre in Houla but this was most probably because Russia did not want to be seen as defending an 
atrocity.160 Based on Russian experience in Checnyha and Beslan, Kremlin strongly believes that 
radical Islamists and outraged rebels, including Al-Qaeda militants, are more capable of carrying out 
such atrocities than the regimes’s security services or the army.161 
Russia is giving an important examination to become a global power in Syria Crisis. In this 
context, while the Kremlin supports the Assad regime in Syria, ideally it looks like Russia is against 
the West and policy of West. Meanwhile, Russia aims to protect its own interests in Syria by 
conducting talks with the key actors for the post-Assad period. For instance Mordechai Kedar who has 
connection with Russia pointed out that the division of Syria is necessary including 14 administrative 
districts that reflect the demographic distribution of the population.162 According to Kedar the partition 
of Syria can only be completed by a historic alliance with Russia and Syria. Another important point is 
the Russian naval existence in the Mediterranean Sea by the way Tartus naval base in Syria. For this 
reason, Russia wants to use every opportunity about the Syrian crisis in order to keep its both 
diplomatic, economic and military existence. Thus Russia negotiates with opposition members (the 
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces) and calls for a agreement  
between the opposition groups and Assad regime.163 Consequently Russia spearheads the idea that the 
Syrian people must be allowed to choose their destiny without foreign pressure or interference which 
means “Syria's future belongs to its people”.164 
Analysis of Four Months In Order to Understand Russian Foreign Policy 
October 2012: On the night of the 10th of October on suspicion of carrying military cargo, 
Turkey forced to land a civilian aircraft to Esenboga Airport in Ankara –capital city of Turkey- by the 
force of the military jets, which was flying from Moscow to Damascus. In Russia it was averred that 
the passengers on board of the aircraft were forced to sign a paper to say that “the aircraft wasn't 
landed by Turkish warplanes but did an emergency landing” and it was also claimed that four 
passengers were beaten.165 Furthermore Russia asserted that the cargoes of the aircraft which were 
seized during the search of Turkish teams were not weapons, rocket and similar munitions. It was 
stated in the Russian Kommersant Newspaper that technical devices carried on the plane were taken 
for the anti-aircraft radar system, belonging to the armed forces of Syria and they had no need for a 
special report.166 As a result, albeit relations were stressed because of the aircraft crisis, Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov reduced the strenuous tension and made a statement that “Syrian aircraft 
which was landed in Ankara that Turkey in this case behaved according to Chicago Convention.” 167 
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November 2012: After the meeting in Cairo about Syria with Lakhdar Brahimi, the special 
envoy of the United Nations and the Arab Countries, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said 
that “the West has achieved success in making decisions at the UN Security Council for further 
aggravation of the situation in Syria and the creation of conditions for the exchange of power.”168 
Afterwards Lavrov, during the meeting with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr also 
announced at the press conference, that about Syria, “Russia doesn't focus on specific person, only 
cares about the people in Syria”. 169 Lavrov also said that Russia would continue cooperation in  
military and technical field with Damascus but they are not in an effort to support any power in 
Syria.170 During this period, upon the issue of arms sales between Russia and Syria on the agenda 
again, Lavrov announced that “we provide weapons to Syria does not mean that we support President 
Bashar Al-Assad, but for our commitments in Soviet period”.171 However, Russia organized meeting 
with Syrian opposition leaders as well as supplying military aids to President Bashar Al-Assad. Then 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov met in Turkey with representatives of  Syria 
Opponents Outside Syria to discuss ways to the resolution of the situation in Syria.172  
December 2012:  On 3 December 2012, after President Putin's visit to Turkey, in the national 
press and the Western news sources have taken place some news that Turkey and Russia agreed to 
Assad’s leaving from Syria.173 However, the news, based on a report released in the New York Times 
suggested that Turkey and Russia have agreed to Assad’s going, are starting to take place quickly.174 
Following this news, Russian press did not receive a confirmation of the reports and did not come an 
official statement from the Kremlin. In the meant time, Russian Pravda published an article of Lyuba 
Lulko of “Has Putin yielded Assad to the West of Turkey?” Lulko stated in the article that Russian 
interests, which Turkey is threatening to destroy are arms agreements, military base and the Russian 
nationals, who are located in Syria. Moreover Lulko emphasized that instead of establishing a patriot 
defense system against Syria, Turkey exceedingly needs to establish this system against Kurdish 
guerillas.175 After Putin's visit it was also claimed in the western press that Russia will give asylum to 
Assad. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov responded to these claims by stating that “such a right has not 
been granted to Assad” and added that he cannot say to Assad that Russia has been withdrawn, it’s not 
because of Assad is indispensable, it’s because Syria is as long as a democratic and free country, it is 
not very important, who manage it.176 
January 2013: Russia sent three warships led by Admiral Kuznetsov to the Mediterranean 
Sea in order to send the message that the Russian Navy after twenty-year break, was back into 
international waters.177 In order to explain the arrival of Russian warships Damascus made a statement 
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that “the Russian navy will patrol to protect the waters of Syria.”178 On the other hand, Moscow 
announced that they are ready to help starting a dialogue between the management of Syria and the 
opposition. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich highlighted that Russia's 
position has not changed, to put an end to conflicts in Syria speeches about the importance of the 
Declaration of Geneva should be converted into practical measures as soon as possible.179 One of the 
most important developments in the month of January is the news that Russia evacuated its citizens, 
located in Syria.  Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov announced about the issue that Moscow does not  
think to reduce the number of personnel at the Russian Embassy in Damascus and did not evacuate its 
citizens in Syria.180 Lavrov, on the other hand, drew attention to that the opponents of  Syria to topple 
Assad follows the wrong way and to continue in this manner in the event of incidents more and more 
people will die.181 Finally in January 2013, Russia has performed the largest exercise in the last twenty 
years in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea182 in order to give a message that the Russians are in the 
Mediterranean again. 
It is known that, from time to time Russia comes together with the opponents not only in 
Moscow but also in Syria and the aim is not to foment Assad regime but to prepare for the future. Not 
to mention that Russia benefited from the student exchange agreements between the two countries 
since 1960. Within the scope of the exchange programs, Russia welcomes many Syrian students in 
Moscow. Among these students there are also young people from Committee of National Co-
operation. These young people were interviewed with Lavrov on November 29 in 2012 and during the 
meeting they stated that Russia should not be next to the regime.183 Indeed, the committee, with the 
aim of achieving reconciliation with Assad in Russia, is working to obtain a place in Moscow in the 
post-Assad term. This initiative made by Moscow in the field of education in the post-Assad term will 
be useful in terms of location in the region of Moscow. 
 
Moscow-Washington Tension: A New Cold War or a Partnership in Syria? 
There has been a tension between Moscow and Washington that has been on the ascent since 
2012. Upon the increased tension after the issuance of the Magnitsky Decision by the US Senate in 
December 2012, the Russian authorities announced that they will respond to the USA in all their 
announcements and recognized Magnitsky Act as exigent issue. Russian President Putin has pointed 
that the US does not have the right to make ethical decisions that would affect the legal system of 
Russia since the US also has human rights violations problems such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghaib.184 
Russia responded to the “Magnitsky Act” as a reprisal by accepting the “Dmitriy Yakovlev 
Act” which banned the US citizens to adopt orphaned children in Russia in 21st of December 2012. 
While Dmitriy Yakovlev Act does not only predict the banning of adopting orphaned children in 
Russia by the US citizens but also the citizens of countries that violate the rights of Russians and 
prohibits the activities of the NGOs that are financed by the USA and constitute a threat to the Russian 
interests within the country. Within this framework, this act envisions the prohibition of the entry of 
those in Russia who violated the rights of Russians or got involved in crimes against the Russian 
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citizens and closing  down their companies in Russia.185 After the act Russia classified the NGOs that 
receive foreign aid as “foreign agents”186 asked USAID which had been operating in Russia for 20 
years and which accused of intervening in the politics and trying to affect the election results to stop 
its activities in Russia in September 2012 as of 1st of October 2012.187 Therefore Russia liaised USAID 
activities with US intelligence services. On the other hand there are other events that raised the 
tensions between Russia and the US in January 2013:  
1. The Jewish Chabad-Lubavitch Hassidic movement whose center is in the US has sued the Russian 
government for the relocation of the “Schneerson Library” which was moved to Russia during the 
World War I and kept in the Lenin Library since 1918, and the Federal court that oversaw the 
issue in the USA decided that the Russian Government should pay 50 thousand dollars for each 
day that it does not relocate the library and Moscow announced that its response will be very 
harsh.188 
2. Russian Premier Dimitriy Medvedev signed the decree that ends the Security and Drug Traffic 
Control treaty signed between the US and Russia in 25th of September 2002.189  
3. Russia’s UN Permanent Representative Vitaly Churkin announced that Russia demands the 
explanation of the information concerning the supply of 20 tons of weapons to Libya from Qatar 
with the aid of the US during the peak of the Libyan crisis from Washington.190 
4. Russia announced that it will stop the import of meat from the US as of 11th of February 2013 and 
this sanction will be for the long term.191 
As a matter of fact, there are also developments that constitute a contradiction with these 
tensions in the bilateral relations between the US and Russia. On November 2012, before the US 
elections, the name of John Kerry passed as a preferred candidate in the Kommersant Newspaper for 
the Minister of foreign affairs and there were expressions by an anonymous ministry staff concerning 
Hillary Clinton as “over-ambitious and aggressive”.192 In consequence, Moscow announced that 
Russia hope to enter more friendly relations with the US and to improve the relations that had been 
going sour in the recent years after the appointment of John Kerry as the minister of foreign affairs. 
The fact that a candidate supported by Russia despite the tension might be regarded as an important 
development for Syria, Iran, and even the Asia Pacific region. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is obvious that Russia considers the post-Assad period in order not to be 
excluded in the process as in the case of Libya. Although it seems as if Moscow did not change its 
stance concerning Syria, Russia also continues talks with the key actors for the post-Essad period. In 
this respect, it can be assumed that the tension between Moscow and Washington is a distraction 
policy for the agreement of two countries on Syrian crisis. Trenin rightly underlines the fact the main 
disagreement between Russia and the rest, including United States, Turkey and Arab countries was 
that Russia insists that Syria is up to the Syrians themselves and outsiders should abstain from 
interfering or from sanctioning Damascus.193 Still, Russia has a range of interests in Syria itself: a 
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naval base located in Tartous,  large arms market; commercial activities such energy contracts; an ally 
government; and a large number of Russian nationals.194 Russian unobstructed foreign policy 
approach commenced in June 2011 with the statement of Russian Deputy Ambassador to the UN, 
Alexander Pankin as; “the current situation in Syria, despite an increase in tension and confrontation, 
does not present a threat to international peace and security…A real threat to regional security, in our 
view, could arise form outside interference in Syria’s domestic situation”195 and did not alter until 
today. 
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